000 05943nam a2200565 i 4500
001 011453129743
003 MOCL
005 20260609132937.0
006 m eo d
007 cr cn |||m|||a
008 180330s2018 nyua fob 000 0deng d
020 _a9781970001815
_qebook
020 _z9781970001822
_qePub
020 _z9781970001808
_qpaperback
020 _z9781970001839
_qhardcover
024 7 _a10.1145/3129743
_2doi
035 _a(CaBNVSL)swl00408225
035 _a(OCoLC)1030021261
040 _aCaBNVSL
_beng
_erda
_cCaBNVSL
_dCaBNVSL
050 4 _aQA76.9.A25
_bL273 2018
082 0 4 _a005.8
_223
100 1 _aLarsen, Per,
_d1980-
_eauthor.
245 1 4 _aThe continuing arms race :
_bcode-reuse attacks and defenses /
_cPer Larsen, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi.
250 _aFirst edition.
264 1 _a[New York] :
_bAssociation for Computing Machinery ;
_a[San Rafael, California] :
_bMorgan & Claypool,
_c2018.
300 _a1 PDF (xiii, 288 pages) :
_billustrations.
336 _atext
_2rdacontent
337 _aelectronic
_2isbdmedia
338 _aonline resource
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aACM books,
_x2374-6777 ;
_v#18
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [261]-281).
505 0 _a1. How memory safety violations enable exploitation of programs / Mathias Payer -- 1.1 Memory safety -- 1.2 Data integrity -- 1.3 Confidentiality -- 1.4 Data-flow and control-flow integrity -- 1.5 Policy enforcement -- 1.6 An adversary's toolkit -- 1.7 Conclusion --
505 8 _a2. Protecting dynamic code / Gang Tan, Ben Niu -- 2.1 Overview of challenges and solutions -- 2.2 Type-based CFG generation -- 2.3 Handling dynamically linked libraries -- 2.4 Handling just-in-time compiled code -- 2.5 Related work -- 2.6 Conclusion --
505 8 _a3. Diversity and information leaks / Stephen Crane, Andrei Homescu, Per Larsen, Hamed Okhravi, Michael Franz -- 3.1 Software diversity -- 3.2 Information leakage -- 3.3 Mitigating information leakage -- 3.4 Address oblivious code reuse -- 3.5 Countering address-oblivious code reuse -- 3.6 Evaluation of code-pointer authentication -- 3.7 Conclusion --
505 8 _a4. Code-pointer integrity / Volodymyr Kuznetzov, Laszlo Szekeres, Mathias Payer, George Candea, R. Sekar, Dawn Song -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Related work -- 4.3 Threat model -- 4.4 Design -- 4.5 The formal model of CPI -- 4.6 Implementation -- 4.7 Evaluation -- 4.8 Conclusion --
505 8 _a5. Evaluating control-flow restricting defenses / Enes Goktas, Elias Athanasopoulos, Herbert Bos, Georgios Portokalidis -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Control-flow restricting defenses -- 5.3 Security analysis -- 5.4 Quantifying gadget availability in CFR -- 5.5 Proof-of-concept exploit against CFR -- 5.6 Summary --
505 8 _a6. Attacking dynamic code / Felix Schuster, Thorsten Holz -- 6.1 Goals and attacker model -- 6.2 Counterfeit object-oriented programming -- 6.3 Loopless counterfeit object-oriented programming -- 6.4 A framework for counterfeit object-oriented programming -- 6.5 Proof-of-concept exploits -- 6.6 Discussion -- 6.7 Security assessment of existing defenses -- 6.8 Conclusion --
505 8 _a7. Hardware control flow integrity / Yier Jin, Dean Sullivan, Orlando Arias, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Lucas Davi -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Threat model and assumptions -- 7.3 Requirements -- 7.4 Modeling CFI -- 7.5 Constructing a precise stateful CFI policy -- 7.6 Hardware-enhanced CFI: design and implementation -- 7.7 Security evaluation -- 7.8 Performance evaluation -- 7.9 Related work -- 7.10 Conclusion --
505 8 _a8. Multi-variant execution environments / Bart Coppens, Bjorn De Sutter, Stijn Volckaert -- 8.1 General design of an MVEE -- 8.2 Implementation of GHUMVEE -- 8.3 Inconsistencies and false positive detections -- 8.4 Comprehensive protection against code-reuse attacks -- 8.5 Relaxed monitoring -- 8.6 Evaluation -- 8.7 Conclusion -- References -- Contributor biographies.
520 3 _aAs human activities moved to the digital domain, so did all the well-known malicious behaviors including fraud, theft, and other trickery. There is no silver bullet, and each security threat calls for a specific answer. One specific threat is that applications accept malformed inputs, and in many cases it is possible to craft inputs that let an intruder take full control over the target computer system. The nature of systems programming languages lies at the heart of the problem. Rather than rewriting decades of well-tested functionality, this book examines ways to live with the (programming) sins of the past while shoring up security in the most efficient manner possible. We explore a range of different options, each making significant progress towards securing legacy programs from malicious inputs. The solutions explored include enforcement-type defenses, which excludes certain program executions because they never arise during normal operation. Another strand explores the idea of presenting adversaries with a moving target that unpredictably changes its attack surface thanks to randomization. We also cover tandem execution ideas where the compromise of one executing clone causes it to diverge from another thus revealing adversarial activities. The main purpose of this book is to provide readers with some of the most influential works on run-time exploits and defenses. We hope that the material in this book will inspire readers and generate new ideas and paradigms.
530 _aAlso available in print.
588 _aTitle from PDF title page (viewed on March 30, 2018).
650 0 _aComputer security.
655 0 _aElectronic books.
700 1 _aSadeghi, Ahmad-Reza,
_eauthor.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_z9781970001839
_z9781970001808
830 0 _aACM books ;
_v#18.
_x2374-6777
856 4 8 _3Abstract with links to full text
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3129743
999 _c886
_d886