000			03391nam a22004818i 4500
001			BRILL9783969752647
003			nllekb
005			20260610105632.0
007			cr un uuuua
008			220930s2022 gw sb 001 0 eng d
020			_a9783969752647 _q(electronic book)
020			_a9783957432643 _q(print)
024	7		_a10.30965/9783969752647 _2DOI
035			_a(OCoLC)1344160847
040			_aNL-LeKB _cNL-LeKB _erda
041			_aeng
050		4	_aB1649
072		7	_aHPM _2bicssc
072		7	_aPHI _x015000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a110 _223
100	1		_aNiemeck, Maik, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aFirst-Person Thought : _bAction, Identification and Experience / _cMaik Niemeck.
246	3		_aAction, Identification and Experience
264		1	_aPaderborn : _bMentis, Brill Deutschland, _c2022.
264		4	_c©2022
300			_a1 online resource
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aSchöningh, Fink and mentis Religious Studies, Theology and Philosophy E-Books Online, Collection 2022
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_tPreliminary Material / _rMaik Niemeck -- Copyright page / _rMaik Niemeck -- Dedication / _rMaik Niemeck -- Acknowledgments / _rMaik Niemeck -- Introduction / _rMaik Niemeck -- Chapter 1 What is Special about First-Person Thought? / _rMaik Niemeck -- Chapter 2 Is the First Person Thick? / _rMaik Niemeck -- Chapter 3 Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification / _rMaik Niemeck -- Chapter 4 Self-Identification and the Regress / _rMaik Niemeck -- Chapter 5 The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness / _rMaik Niemeck -- Chapter 6 How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience? / _rMaik Niemeck -- Chapter 7 Conclusions / _rMaik Niemeck -- Literature / _rMaik Niemeck -- Index / _rMaik Niemeck.
520			_aThe book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.
546			_aEnglish
588			_aDescription based on print version record.
650		0	_aKnowledge, Theory of.
650		0	_aMetaphysics.
650		0	_aPhilosophy.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _tFirst-Person Thought : Action, Identification and Experience. _dPaderborn : Mentis, Brill Deutschland, 2022. _z9783957432643 _w(OCoLC)1344397915
830		0	_aSchöningh, Fink and mentis Religious Studies, Theology and Philosophy E-Books Online, Collection 2022.
856	4		_zDOI: _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.30965/9783969752647
999			_c42617 _d42617