| 000 | 05726nam a2200541 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 011452611390 | ||
| 005 | 20260528133338.0 | ||
| 006 | m eo d | ||
| 007 | cr cn |||m|||a | ||
| 008 | 150428s2014 nyua fob 000 0deng d | ||
| 020 |
_a9781627054751 _qebook |
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| 020 |
_z9781627054768 _qePub |
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| 020 |
_z9781627054744 _qprint |
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| 024 | 7 |
_a10.1145/2611390 _2doi |
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| 035 | _a(OCoLC)908155883 | ||
| 040 |
_aCaBNVSL _beng _erda _cCaBNVSL _dCaBNVSL |
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| 050 | 4 |
_aTK7867.2 _b.G654 2014 |
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| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a621.38224 _223 |
| 035 | _a(CaBNVSL)swl00404867 | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aGollakota, Shyamnath., _eauthor. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aEmbracing interference in wireless systems / _cShyamnath Gollakota. |
| 250 | _aFirst edition. | ||
| 264 | 1 |
_a[New York] : _bAssociation for Computing Machinery ; _a[San Rafael, California] : _bMorgan & Claypool, _c2014. |
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| 300 |
_a1 PDF (xiv, 157 pages) : _billustrations. |
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| 336 |
_atext _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_aelectronic _2isbdmedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _2rdacarrier |
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| 490 | 1 |
_aACM books ; _v#1 |
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| 504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 147-157). | ||
| 506 | _aAbstract freely available; full-text restricted to subscribers or individual document purchasers. | ||
| 588 | _aTitle from PDF title page (viewed on April 28, 2015). | ||
| 538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
| 538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. | ||
| 505 | 0 | _a1. Introduction -- 1.1 Embracing wireless interference -- 1.1.1 Decoding 802.11 collisions -- 1.1.2 Combating high-power cross-technology interference -- 1.1.3 Non-invasive approach to securing medical implants -- 1.1.4 Secure pairing without passwords or prior secrets -- 1.2 Organization -- | |
| 505 | 8 | _a2. Decoding 802.11 collisions -- 2.1 Related work -- 2.2 Scope -- 2.3 A communication primer -- 2.3.1 Practical issues -- 2.4 ZigZag decoding -- 2.4.1 Is it a collision? -- 2.4.2 Did the AP receive two matching collisions? -- 2.4.3 How does the AP decode matching collisions? -- 2.4.4 Estimating and tracking system parameters -- 2.5 Dealing with errors -- 2.6 Backward compatibility -- 2.7 Beyond two interferers -- 2.8 Complexity -- 2.9 Experimental environment -- 2.9.1 Setup -- 2.9.2 Micro-evaluation -- 2.9.3 Does ZigZag work -- 2.9.4 The impact of the SNR -- 2.9.5 Testbed throughput and loss rate -- 2.9.6 Many hidden terminals -- 2.10 Discussion -- | |
| 505 | 8 | _a3. Combating high-power cross-technology interference -- 3.1 Impact of cross-technology interference on 802.11n -- 3.1.1 Digital cordless phone -- 3.1.2 Baby monitor -- 3.1.3 Microwave ovens -- 3.1.4 Frequency hopping bluetooth -- 3.1.5 Summary -- 3.2 MIMO and OFDM background -- 3.3 Problem domain -- 3.4 TIMO -- 3.5 Decoding in the presence of cross-technology interference -- 3.5.1 Computing the interferer's channel ratio -- 3.5.2 Decoding the signal of interest -- 3.5.3 Iterating to increase accuracy -- 3.5.4 Estimating the 802.11n channel functions -- 3.5.5 Finding the interference boundaries -- 3.5.6 Putting it together -- 3.5.7 Complexity -- 3.6 Ensuring the interferer can decode -- 3.7 Implementation -- 3.8 Performance evaluation -- 3.8.1 Cordless phone -- 3.8.2 Baby monitor -- 3.8.3 Microwave oven -- 3.8.4 Multiple interferers -- 3.9 Micro benchmarks -- 3.10 Related work -- 3.11 Discussion -- | |
| 505 | 8 | _a4. Non-invasive approach to securing medical implants -- 4.1 IMD communication primer -- 4.2 Assumptions and threat model -- 4.2.1 Assumptions -- 4.2.2 Threat model -- 4.3 System overview -- 4.4 Jammer-cum-receiver -- 4.5 Protecting against passive eavesdroppers -- 4.6 Protecting against active adversaries -- 4.7 Implementation -- 4.8 Testing environment -- 4.9 Evaluation -- 4.9.1 Micro-benchmark results -- 4.9.2 Protecting from passive adversaries -- 4.9.3 Protecting from active adversaries -- 4.10 Coexistence -- 4.11 Related work -- 4.12 Discussion -- | |
| 505 | 8 | _a5. Secure pairing without passwords or prior secrets -- 5.1 Related work -- 5.2 PBC and 802.11 background -- 5.2.1 Push button configuration -- 5.2.2 802.11 -- 5.3 Security model -- 5.3.1 Threat model -- 5.3.2 Security guarantees -- 5.4 TEP design -- 5.4.1 Tamper-evident message (TEM) -- 5.4.2 Securing PBC using TEM -- 5.4.3 Example scenarios -- 5.4.4 Making pairing faster -- 5.5 TEM on off-the-shelf hardware -- 5.5.1 Scheduling slot transmission -- 5.5.2 Energy detection at the receiver -- 5.5.3 Sending a synchronization packet -- 5.5.4 Checking for TEM while transmitting -- 5.6 Evaluation -- 5.6.1 Evaluating TEP's security -- 5.6.2 Evaluating TEP's accuracy -- 5.6.3 Evaluating TEP's performance -- 5.6.4 Performance with non-802.11 traffic -- 5.7 Discussion -- | |
| 505 | 8 | _a6. Conclusion -- 6.1 Looking forward -- Bibliography -- Author's biography. | |
| 520 | 3 | _aThe wireless medium is a shared resource. If nearby devices transmit at the same time, their signals interfere, resulting in a collision. In traditional networks, collisions cause the loss of the transmitted information. For this reason, wireless networks have been designed with the assumption that interference is intrinsically harmful and must be avoided. This book takes an alternate approach: instead of viewing interference as an inherently counterproductive phenomenon that should to be avoided, we design practical systems that transform interference into a harmless, and even beneficial, phenomenon. | |
| 530 | _aAlso available in print. | ||
| 650 | 0 | _aElectromagnetic interference. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aWireless communication systems. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aCoding theory. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrint version: _z9781627054744 |
| 830 | 0 |
_aACM books ; _v#1. |
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| 856 | 4 | 8 |
_3Abstract with links to full text _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2611390 |
| 999 |
_c355 _d355 |
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