000 03345nam a2200577 i 4500
001 BRILL9789047419549
003 nllekb
005 20260610105303.0
007 cr un uuuua
008 061204s2007 ne sb 001 0deng
010 _a 2006051896
015 _aGBA703270
_2bnb
016 7 _a013640393
_2Uk
016 7 _aB0704518
_2bccb
019 _a77797552
020 _a9789047419549
_q(electronic book)
020 _z9789004156616
_q(print)
024 7 _a10.1163/ej.9789004156616.i-268
_2DOI
035 _a(OCoLC)76925125
_z(OCoLC)77797552
040 _aNL-LeKB
_cNL-LeKB
_erda
043 _ae-fr---
050 4 _aDC126
_b.M37 2007
082 0 4 _a944/.033
_222
100 1 _aMcCullough, Roy L.
245 1 0 _aCoercion, conversion and counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's Franc e
264 1 _aLeiden ;
_aBoston :
_bBrill,
_c2007.
300 _a1 online resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_2rdacarrier
440 0 _aHistory of warfare,
_x1385-7827 ;
_vv. 42
490 0 _aBrill eBook titles 2007
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [253]-261) and index.
505 0 0 _tPreliminary Material /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tIntroduction /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tChapter One. ‘Huissier, Garnisaire Et Soldat’: Coercion And Tax Collection Under Louis XIV /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tChapter Two. The Response To Popular Revolt, 1662–1670 /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tChapter Three. Regional Crisis And Royal Consolidation: The Revolts Of 1675 /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tChapter Four. ‘Les Missions Bottés’: Religious Coercion Under Louis XIV /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tChapter Five. The Revolt Of The Camisards, 1702–1704 /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tConclusion /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tBibliography /
_rR.L. Mccullough --
_tIndex /
_rR.L. Mccullough.
506 1 _aAvailable to subscribing member institutions only.
520 _aThis is a study of the domestic application of armed coercion during the reign of Louis XIV. It examines the coercive aspects of tax collection, the royal response to tax revolts, and the use of force to convert the king’s Protestant subjects and to wage a devastating counterinsurgency campaign against Protestant rebels in the mountains and plains of Languedoc. Relying heavily on archival sources, the study demonstrates that both the coercive inclination of Louis XIV and the coercive capabilities of the French army have been overstated. This raises questions about some common assumptions regarding the role of the army in the projection of state power and its contribution to the process of state formation in Early Modern France.
650 1 7 _aDwang.
_2gtt
650 1 7 _aOnderdrukking.
_2gtt
650 1 7 _aOpstanden.
_2gtt
650 0 _aPersecution
_zFrance
_xHistory.
650 0 _aPolitical violence
_zFrance
_xHistory.
651 7 _aFrankrijk.
_2gtt
651 0 _aFrance
_xHistory
_yLouis XIV, 1643-1715.
651 0 _aFrance
_xPolitics and government
_y1643-1715.
776 0 _z9789004156616
_z9004156615 (hardback : alk. paper)
830 0 _aHistory of Warfare
_v42.
830 0 _aEuropean History and Culture E-Books Online, Collection 2007, ISBN: 9789004222830.
856 4 _zDOI:
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004156616.i-268
994 _aC0
_bNEIDC
999 _c30463
_d30463