000			02765nam a22004698i 4500
001			BRILL9789004517844
003			nllekb
005			20260610104903.0
007			cr un uuuua
008			220531s2022 ne sb 001 0 eng d
010			_z 2022933812
020			_a9789004517844 _q(electronic book)
020			_a9789004514638 _q(print)
024	7		_a10.1163/9789004517844 _2DOI
035			_a(OCoLC)1317322680
040			_aNL-LeKB _cNL-LeKB _erda
050		4	_aKZ3275
072		7	_aLNL _2bicssc
072		7	_aLAW _x016000 _2bisacsh
072		7	_aLAW _x035000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a332.6 _223
100	1		_aLehtimäki, Mika, _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe Investment Game in Private Equity / _cMika Lehtimäki.
264		1	_aLeiden ; _aBoston : _bBrill, _c2022.
300			_a1 online resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aBrill Research Perspectives in International Law
500			_aIn The Investment Game in Private Equity, Mika Lehtimäki discusses the legal relationship between investors and managers of private equity funds and sets out a game-theoretical framework for evaluating the role of regulation and contract in asset management.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0	0	_tPreliminary Material / _rMika J. Lehtimäki -- _tCopyright page / _rMika J. Lehtimäki -- _tThe Investment Game in Private Equity / _rMika J. Lehtimäki.
520			_aIn The Investment Game in Private Equity, Mika Lehtimäki discusses the legal and contractual relationship between investors and managers of private equity funds as well as the economic incentives governing their relationship. Based on this analysis he sets out a game-theoretical framework for evaluating the role of regulation and contract in asset management. He argues that the contractual ‘investment game’ between the parties, noting their outcome maximisation objective, results in much of the current fund regulation being non-optimal from the investor perspective. This means that the parties are able to control, subject to qualifications relating to the bargaining process, their relationship and the protect their interests contractually instead of resorting to extensive regulation.
588			_aDescription based on print version record.
650		0	_aCapital investment.
650		0	_aInternational law.
650		0	_aGame theory.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _tThe Investment Game in Private Equity. _dLeiden ; Boston : Brill, 2022 _z9789004514638 _w(OCoLC)1303075703
830		0	_aBrill Research Perspectives in International Law.
856	4		_zDOI: _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004517844
999			_c16673 _d16673