000 03515nam a22004938i 4500
001 BRILL9789004633001
003 nllekb
005 20260610104856.0
007 cr un uuuua
008 240309s1998 gw sb 001 0 eng d
020 _a9789004633001
_q(electronic book)
020 _z9789041104991
_q(print)
024 7 _a10.1163/9789004633001
_2DOI
035 _z(OCoLC)37712938
040 _aNL-LeKB
_cNL-LeKB
_erda
041 _aeng
050 4 _aDR1313.7.P43
072 7 _aLAW
_x051000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aLAW
_x075000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aLBB
_2bicssc
082 0 4 _a949.703
_223
100 1 _aRossanet, Bertrand de ,
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aWar and Peace in the Former Yugoslavia /
_cBertrand de Rossanet.
264 1 _aLeiden ;
_aBoston :
_bBrill | Nijhoff,
_c1998.
264 4 _c©1998
300 _a1 online resource (200 pages) :
_billustrations.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aInternational Law - Book Archive pre-2000
490 1 _aNijhoff Law Specials ;
_v33
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 _tPreliminary Material /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter One The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter Two Mediators and Combatants' Determination to Fight: Bosnia /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter Three Nato: Helping to Bring Peace or Waiting for War? /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter Four Humanitarian Assistance for War-Making? /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter Five Peace-Making and Peace Observation: Mission on the Drina /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter Six Governmental versus International Mediators: Dayton /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter Seven Mediators in the Face of Bloody-Mindedness: Croatia /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter Eight Lawyers in the Peace-Making Process /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Chapter Nine Human Rights and Peace-Making /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Conclusion /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Index /
_rBertrand de Rossanet -- Nijhoff Law Specials /
_rBertrand de Rossanet.
520 _aThis book argues that the efforts of international mediators to stop the war in Bosnia were deliberately thwarted by the factions, who chose war over peace. Major powers backed clients among the warring parties, and prolonged the war, instead of helping to bring it to an end. NATO sat on the fence when it could have helped bring peace, leading to two more years of war. When the USA finally engaged in the search for peace it did so for domestic political reasons, trampled on the very moral precepts it had used to kill off earlier peace plans, used the building-blocks of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, without acknowledgement, to draft the Dayton documents, and ended up with a plan that was inferior by far to the earlier Vance-Owen or Stoltenberg-Owen plans. Thoroughly documented, this book will long be discussed by diplomatic historians of the conflict.
546 _aEnglish
588 _aDescription based on print version record.
650 0 _aDiplomatic history.
650 0 _aPeace.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_tWar and Peace in the Former Yugoslavia.
_dLeiden ; Boston : Brill | Nijhoff, 1998.
_z9789041104991
_w(DLC) 97038510
830 0 _aInternational Law - Book Archive pre-2000.
830 0 _aNijhoff Law Specials ;
_v33.
856 4 _zDOI:
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004633001
999 _c16245
_d16245