000			03438cam a22004455i 4500
001			BRILL9783957438492
003			nllekb
005			20260610104835.0
007			cr un uuuua
008			190109s2018 gw 000 0 eng
010			_a 2018448602
020			_a9783957438492 _q(electronic book)
020			_z9783957430342 _q(print)
024	7		_a10.30965/9783957438492 _2DOI
035			_a(GyWOH)har170495440
040			_aNL-LeKB _cNL-LeKB _erda
050	1	4	_aBC199.P2
072		7	_aHPL _2bicssc
072		7	_aPHI _x011000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a177.3
100	1		_aPleitz, Martin.
245	1	0	_aLogic, language, and the liar paradox / _cMartin Pleitz.
264		1	_aMünster : _bMentis, _c[2018]
300			_a1 online resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _2rdacarrier
490	0		_aSchöningh, Fink and mentis Religious Studies, Theology and Philosophy E-Books Online, Collection 2018, ISBN: 9783657100101
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages <631>-651)
505	0	0	_aPreliminary Material -- The Liar and Its Kind -- Informal Logic and the Liar Reasoning -- Formal Logic and Tarski’s Legacy -- Meaning, Semantics, and Reductionism -- Singular Terms and the Spectrum of Liar Sentences -- Is There a Gödelian Liar Sentence? -- How Can the Liar Paradox be Solved? -- The Changing World of Expressions -- Language in a Changing World -- Changeable Truth in Language and World -- A Self-Referential Language as Its Own Changing World I: Subsequentist Metaphysics -- A Self-Referential Language as Its Own Changing World II: Subsequentist Semantics -- Subsequentism Solves the Liar Paradox -- Literature.
520			_aThe Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist – and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this –, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals.
650		0	_aSemantics (Philosophy)
650		0	_aTruth.
650		0	_aTruthfulness and falsehood.
650		0	_aLiar paradox.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _tLogic, Language, and the Liar Paradox _dPaderborn : mentis, [2018], _z9783957430342
830		0	_aSchöningh, Fink and mentis Religious Studies, Theology and Philosophy E-Books Online, Collection 2018, ISBN: 9783657100101.
856	4		_zDOI: _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.30965/9783957438492
999			_c15085 _d15085