| 000 | 02749nam a22004218i 4500 | ||
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| 001 | CR9781009707626 | ||
| 003 | UkCbUP | ||
| 005 | 20260610102100.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|||||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 250425s2025||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d | ||
| 020 | _a9781009707626 (ebook) | ||
| 020 | _z9781009707671 (hardback) | ||
| 020 | _z9781009707664 (paperback) | ||
| 040 |
_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP |
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| 050 | 4 |
_aJF2111 _b.T73 2025 |
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| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a306.2 _223 |
| 100 | 1 |
_aTrantidis, Aris, _eauthor. _0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2015070663 _1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3709-1201 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aClientelism / _cAris Trantidis. |
| 264 | 1 |
_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2025. |
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| 300 |
_a1 online resource (85 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s). |
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| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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| 341 | 0 |
_3PDF _bSingle logical reading order _2onix |
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| 341 | 0 |
_3PDF _bTable of content navigation _2onix |
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| 341 | 0 |
_bWCAG level AA _2onix |
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| 490 | 1 |
_aCambridge elements. Elements in Austrian economics, _x2399-651X |
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| 500 | _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 26 Nov 2025). | ||
| 506 | 0 |
_aOpen Access. _fUnrestricted online access _2star |
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| 520 | _aThis Element examines clientelism and its impact on democratic institutions and markets, emphasizing that, alongside electoral competition, politics hosts two additional arenas: one where political actors seek campaign resources and active supporters, and another where socioeconomic actors pursue access to state-distributed resources. Clientelism emerges from reciprocal exchanges between these actors. Political parties use clientelism to incentivize collective action and organize campaigns. Playing this 'clientelist game', no party can reduce clientelistic practices without risking electoral defeat or internal fragmentation. Clientelism weakens the provision of public goods and skews policymaking to benefit clients over general welfare. Eventually, it generates an economic 'tragedy of the commons', as state resources are overexploited and the economy suffers, while formal institutions often fail to constrain it. Even in advanced democracies like the United States, political competition is not only electoral, targeting voters, but structurally clientelist. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. | ||
| 532 | 2 | _aWARNING - Flashing hazard | |
| 532 | 8 | _aLatest accessibility assessment date: 20251119 | |
| 650 | 0 | _aPatronage, Political. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrint version: _z9781009707671 |
| 830 | 0 |
_aCambridge elements. _pElements in Austrian economics, _x2399-651X. |
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| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009707626 |
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_c10498 _d10498 |
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