Includes bibliographical references (p. [215]-229) and index.

Preliminary Material / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Introduction / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Chapter One. The Unilateral Strategy / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Chapter Two. A Comparative Analysis Of EC And US Merger Control Law: The Institutional Framework And Procedural Rules / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Chapter Three. A Comparative Analysis Of EC And US Merger Control Law: The Substantive Rules / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Chapter Four. A Comparative Analysis Of Merger Control Laws Enacted By Other Jurisdictions / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Chapter Five. The Bilateral Strategy / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Chapter Six. Multilateral Strategy: Instruments Of Hard Law / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Chapter Seven. Multilateral Strategy: Instruments Of Soft Law / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Conclusions / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- List Of Abbreviations / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Bibliography / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia -- Index / D. Liakopoulos and A. Marsilia.

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The major problem associated with the regulation of transnational mergers, which affect several national markets, is the allocation of jurisdiction. Each country concerned may wish to exert jurisdiction and apply its national competition law to regulate the anti-competitive effects a merger may have in its territory. However, this approach may lead to risks of inconsistent decisions regarding the legality of mergers. Indeed, the national competition laws applied by the regulating authorities may diverge in several aspects, which raise the likelihood of inconsistency. Therefore it is desirable to opt for regulatory approaches which are more sensitive to the transnational nature of mergers and which allow cooperation between competition authorities. A possible solution may be bilateral cooperation agreements through which two countries coordinate the enforcement activities of their national competition authorities. However, the benefits of these agreements are enjoyed only by the signatory parties. The sole reliance upon bilateral agreements does not appear to be the optimal regulatory approach towards transnational mergers.