Includes bibliographical references (p. 279-289) and index.

Preliminary Materials / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 1. Early Warnings And Early Action / Bystanders -- Chapter 2. The Tribunal’S Interpretation And Implementation Of The Genocide Convention / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 3. Rwandan History / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 4. Undermining Unamir / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 5. The Installment Of Unamir With Belgian Participation / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 6. Early Warning Of Atrocities In 1991-1994 / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 7. Early Warnings From November To January / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 8. The Genocide Fax And The Prohibition From U.N. Headquarters To Act / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 9. The Negative Response Of New York And Capitals In The West To The Deteriorating Situation / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 10. Deteriorating Security In Rwanda And The Negative Response From New York From January Up Until March / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 11. Requests From Dallaire And From Belgium To New York For A Stronger And Firmer Broadened Mandate For Unamir / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 12. Unamir: Its Mandate And The Offending Belgian Role / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 13. The Start Of The Genocide / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 14. Evacuation / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 15. Belgian Decision To Withdraw Its Troops / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 16. The Response Of The Security Council / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 17. The Role Of The Netherlands Throughout The Genocide / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 18. Apologies From Bystanders Ten Years Later / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Chapter 19. Conclusions / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Annexes / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Bibliography / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom -- Index / Grünfeld and A. Huijboom.

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This volume is about the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In particular, the research focuses on why the early warnings of an emerging genocide were not translated into early preventative action. The warnings were well documented by the most authoritative source, the Canadian U.N. peace-keeping commander General Romeo Dallaire and sent to the leading political civil servants in New York. The communications and the decisionmaking are scrutinized, id est, who received what messages at what time, to whom the messages were forwarded and which (non-) decisions were taken in response to the alarming reports of weapon deliveries and atrocities. This book makes clear that this genocide could have been prevented. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.