Includes bibliographical references and index.

Preliminary Material / Maik Niemeck -- Copyright page / Maik Niemeck -- Dedication / Maik Niemeck -- Acknowledgments / Maik Niemeck -- Introduction / Maik Niemeck -- Chapter 1 What is Special about First-Person Thought? / Maik Niemeck -- Chapter 2 Is the First Person Thick? / Maik Niemeck -- Chapter 3 Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification / Maik Niemeck -- Chapter 4 Self-Identification and the Regress / Maik Niemeck -- Chapter 5 The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness / Maik Niemeck -- Chapter 6 How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience? / Maik Niemeck -- Chapter 7 Conclusions / Maik Niemeck -- Literature / Maik Niemeck -- Index / Maik Niemeck.

The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.

English

Description based on print version record.