Includes bibliographical references and index.

Introduction -- Compliance, Coordination, and Censorship: Switzerland’s Response to Palestinian and Brazilian Terrorism -- -- Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism: The 1969 Kloten Airport Attack and the 1970 Skyjack Sunday1 -- Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism: The Abduction of Ambassador Bucher (1970–71) -- Conclusions of Part 1: A Comparison of Crisis Management -- At the Forefront through the Backdoor: Switzerland’s Counterterrorism Diplomacy -- -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the icao: “An Elegant Way of Doing Nothing” -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the un: A Fastidiously Balanced Position -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE: Experts “Making” Foreign Policy -- Conclusions of Part 2: Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in Multilateral Fora -- In Defiance of Neutrality: Switzerland’s Secret Counterterrorism Cooperation -- -- A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance: Intelligence-Sharing within the Club de Berne (1971–1972) -- Conclusions of Part 3: A Glimpse into the Club de Berne in the 1980s -- Conclusions.

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Switzerland suffered four major terrorist attacks in 1969 and 1970, which forced the Swiss government to address the issue of international terrorism for the first time. Subsequently, “neutral” Switzerland worked closely with Western Cold War powers to develop international counterterrorism measures and forged a European-Israeli counterterrorist alignment to counter Palestinian terrorism in Europe. Using recently declassified archival records, this book is the first study to examine how the Swiss government positioned the country within the international struggle against terrorism. The book brings to light the creation of the Club de Berne, a secret European network of intelligence agencies connected to Israel and the United States. It offers new insights about the history of Swiss, Western European, and Israeli security cooperation.