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Hardness of approximation between P and NP / (Record no. 891)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 06639nam a2200637 i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 9781947287215
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field MOCL
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20260609132937.0
006 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--ADDITIONAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS
fixed length control field m eo d
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field cr cn |||m|||a
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 190719r20192019nyua ob 001 0 eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781947287215
Qualifying information eBook
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781947287222
Qualifying information ePub
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
Canceled/invalid ISBN 9781947287239
Qualifying information hardcover
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
Canceled/invalid ISBN 9781947287208
Qualifying information paperback
024 8# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER
Standard number or code 10.1145/3241304
Source of number or code doi
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (CaBNVSL)thg00979248
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency CaBNVSL
Language of cataloging eng
Description conventions rda
Transcribing agency CaBNVSL
Modifying agency CaBNVSL
050 #4 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number QA269
Item number .R835 2019eb
082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 519.3
Edition information 23
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Rubinstein, Aviad,
Relator term author.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Hardness of approximation between P and NP /
Statement of responsibility, etc. Aviad Rubinstein.
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement First edition.
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture [New York, New York] :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Association for Computing Machinery,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice [2019]
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 PDF (xv, 301 pages) :
Other physical details illustrations (chiefly color).
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term text
Source rdacontent
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type term electronic
Source isbdmedia
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Carrier type term online resource
Source rdacarrier
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement ACM books,
International Standard Serial Number 2374-6777 ;
Volume/sequential designation #24
538 ## - SYSTEM DETAILS NOTE
System details note Mode of access: World Wide Web.
538 ## - SYSTEM DETAILS NOTE
System details note System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note Revision of author's thesis (doctoral)--University of California, Berkeley, 2017.
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Includes bibliographical references (pages [273]-290) and index.
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note part I. Overview -- 1. The frontier of intractability -- 1.1. PPAD : finding a needle you know is in the haystack -- 1.2. Quasi-polynomial time and the birthday paradox -- 1.3. Approximate Nash equilibrium
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 2. Preliminaries -- 2.1. Nash equilibrium and relaxations -- 2.2. PPAD and end-of-a-line -- 2.3. Exponential time hypotheses -- 2.4. PCP theorems -- 2.5. Learning theory -- 2.6. Information theory -- 2.7. Useful lemmata
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note part II. Communication complexity -- 3. Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium -- 3.1. Uncoupled dynamics -- 3.2. Techniques -- 3.3. Additional related literature -- 3.4. Proof overview -- 3.5. Proofs -- 3.6. An open problem : correlated equilibria in 2-player games
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 4. Brouwer's fixed point -- 4.1. Brouwer with �[infinity] -- 4.2. Euclidean Brouwer
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note part III. PPAD -- 5. PPAD-hardness of approximation
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 6. The generalized circuit problem -- 6.1. Proof overview -- 6.2. From Brouwer to [epsilon]-Gcircuit -- 6.3. Gcircuit with fan-out 2
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 7. Many-player games -- 7.1. Graphical, polymatrix games -- 7.2. Succinct games
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 8. Bayesian Nash equilibrium -- 9. Market equilibrium -- 9.1. Why are non-monotone markets hard? -- 9.2. High-level structure of the proof -- 9.3. Adaptations for constant factor inapproximability -- 9.4. Non-monotone markets : proof of inapproximability
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 10. CourseMatch -- 10.1. The course allocation problem -- 10.2. A-CEEI is PPAD-hard -- 10.3. A-CEEI [epsilon] PPAD
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note part IV. Quasi-polynomial time -- 11. Birthday repetition -- 11.1. Warm-up : best [epsilon]-Nash
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 12. Densest k-subgraph -- 12.1. Construction (and completeness) -- 12.2. Soundness
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 13. Community detection -- 13.1. Related works -- 13.2. Overview of proofs -- 13.3. Hardness of counting communities -- 13.4. Hardness of detecting communities
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 14. VC and Littlestone's dimensions -- 14.1. Discussion -- 14.2. Techniques -- 14.3. Related Work -- 14.4. Inapproximability of the VC dimension -- 14.5. Inapproximability of Littlestone's dimension -- 14.6. Quasi-polynomial algorithm for Littlestone's dimension
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 15. Signaling -- 15.1. Techniques -- 15.2. Near-optimal signaling is hard
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note part V. Approximate Nash equilibrium -- 16. 2-player approximate Nash equilibrium -- 16.1. Technical overview -- 16.2. End-of-a-line with local computation -- 16.3. Holographic proof -- 16.4. Polymatrix WeakNash -- 16.5. From Polymatrix to Bimatrix.
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in Game Theory. Since Nash's original paper in 1951, it has found countless applications in modeling strategic behavior of traders in markets, (human) drivers and (electronic) routers in congested networks, nations in nuclear disarmament negotiations, and more. A decade ago, the relevance of this solution concept was called into question by computer scientists, who proved (under appropriate complexity assumptions) that computing a Nash equilibrium is an intractable problem. And if centralized, specially designed algorithms cannot find Nash equilibria, why should we expect distributed, selfish agents to converge to one? The remaining hope was that at least approximate Nash equilibria can be efficiently computed. Understanding whether there is an efficient algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium has been the central open problem in this field for the past decade. In this book, we provide strong evidence that even finding an approximate Nash equilibrium is intractable. We prove several intractability theorems for different settings (two-player games and many-player games) and models (computational complexity, query complexity, and communication complexity). In particular, our main result is that under a plausible and natural complexity assumption ("Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD"), there is no polynomial-time algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. The problem of approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game poses a unique technical challenge: it is a member of the class PPAD, which captures the complexity of several fundamental total problems, i.e., problems that always have a solution; and it also admits a quasipolynomial time algorithm. Either property alone is believed to place this problem far below NP-hard problems in the complexity hierarchy; having both simultaneously places it just above P, at what can be called the frontier of intractability. Indeed, the tools we develop in this book to advance on this frontier are useful for proving hardness of approximation of several other important problems whose complexity lies between P and NP: Brouwer's fixed point, market equilibrium, CourseMatch (A-CEEI), densest k-subgraph, community detection, VC dimension and Littlestone dimension, and signaling in zero-sum games.
530 ## - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM AVAILABLE NOTE
Additional physical form available note Also available in print.
588 ## - SOURCE OF DESCRIPTION NOTE
Source of description note Title from PDF title page (viewed on July 19, 2019).
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Game theory.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Programming (Mathematics)
776 08 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Relationship information Print version:
International Standard Book Number 9781947287239
-- 9781947287208
856 42 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Materials specified Abstract with links to full text
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3241304">https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3241304</a>

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