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Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers / (Record no. 352)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 07156nam a2200541 i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 01145/2611399
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20260528133338.0
006 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--ADDITIONAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS
fixed length control field m eo d
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field cr cn |||m|||a
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 150428s2014 nyua fob 000 0deng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781627054782
Qualifying information ebook
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
Canceled/invalid ISBN 9781627054799
Qualifying information ePub
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
Canceled/invalid ISBN 9781627054775
Qualifying information print
024 7# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER
Standard number or code 10.1145/2611399
Source of number or code doi
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (OCoLC)908155788
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency CaBNVSL
Language of cataloging eng
Description conventions rda
Transcribing agency CaBNVSL
Modifying agency CaBNVSL
050 #4 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number QA76.9.A25
Item number P277 2014
082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 005.8
Edition information 23
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (CaBNVSL)swl00404864
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Parno, Bryan.,
Relator term author.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers /
Statement of responsibility, etc. Bryan Jeffrey Parno.
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement First edition.
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture [New York] :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Association for Computing Machinery ;
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture [San Rafael, California] :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Morgan & Claypool,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2014.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 PDF (xvii, 188 pages) :
Other physical details illustrations.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term text
Source rdacontent
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type term electronic
Source isbdmedia
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Carrier type term online resource
Source rdacarrier
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement ACM books ;
Volume/sequential designation #2
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Includes bibliographical references (pages 173-188).
506 ## - RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS NOTE
Terms governing access Abstract freely available; full-text restricted to subscribers or individual document purchasers.
588 ## - SOURCE OF DESCRIPTION NOTE
Source of description note Title from PDF title page (viewed on April 28, 2015).
538 ## - SYSTEM DETAILS NOTE
System details note Mode of access: World Wide Web.
538 ## - SYSTEM DETAILS NOTE
System details note System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Insecure computers in a hostile world -- 1.2 A vision for a better world -- 1.3 Overview: building up from a firm foundation -- 1.4 Bootstrapping trust in a commodity computer -- 1.5 Securely executing code on a commodity computer -- 1.6 Leveraging secure code execution to improve network protocols -- 1.7 Secure code execution despite untrusted software and hardware -- 1.8 Summary of contributions --
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 2. Background and related work in trust establishment -- 2.1 What do we need to know? Techniques for recording platform state -- 2.1.1 Recording code identity -- 2.1.2 Recording dynamic properties -- 2.1.3 Which property is necessary? -- 2.2 Can we use platform information locally? -- 2.2.1 Secure boot -- 2.2.2 Storage access control based on code identity -- 2.3 Can we use platform information remotely? -- 2.3.1 Prerequisites -- 2.3.2 Conveying code measurement chains -- 2.3.3 Privacy concerns -- 2.4 How do we make sense of platform state? -- 2.4.1 Coping with information overload -- 2.4.2 Focusing on security-relevant code -- 2.4.3 Conveying higher-level information -- 2.5 Roots of trust -- 2.5.1 General-purpose tamper-resistant and tamper-responding devices -- 2.5.2 General-purpose devices without dedicated physical defenses -- 2.5.3 Special-purpose minimal devices -- 2.5.4 Research solutions without hardware support -- 2.5.5 Cryptographic protocols -- 2.6 Validating the process -- 2.7 Applications -- 2.7.1 Real world -- 2.7.2 Research proposals -- 2.8 Human factors and usability -- 2.8.1 Trustworthy verifier device -- 2.8.2 Using your brain to check a computer -- 2.8.3 Pairing two trustworthy devices -- 2.9 Limitations -- 2.9.1 Load-time vs. run-time guarantees -- 2.9.2 Hardware attacks -- 2.10 Additional reading -- 2.11 Summary --
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 3. Bootstrapping trust in a commodity computer -- 3.1 Problem definition -- 3.1.1 Informal problem description -- 3.1.2 Formal model -- 3.2 Potential solutions -- 3.2.1 Removing network access -- 3.2.2 Eliminating malware -- 3.2.3 Establishing a secure channel -- 3.3 Preferred solutions -- 3.4 Summary --
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 4. On-demand secure code execution on commodity computers -- 4.1 Problem definition -- 4.1.1 Adversary model -- 4.1.2 Goals -- 4.2 Flicker architecture -- 4.2.1 Flicker overview -- 4.2.2 Isolated execution -- 4.2.3 Multiple flicker sessions -- 4.2.4 Interaction with a remote party -- 4.3 Developer's perspective -- 4.3.1 Creating a PAL -- 4.3.2 Automation -- 4.4 Flicker applications -- 4.4.1 Stateless applications -- 4.4.2 Integrity-protected state -- 4.4.3 Secret and integrity-protected state -- 4.5 Performance evaluation -- 4.5.1 Experimental setup -- 4.5.2 Microbenchmarks -- 4.5.3 Stateless applications -- 4.5.4 Integrity-protected state -- 4.5.5 Secret and integrity-protected state -- 4.5.6 Impact on suspended operating system -- 4.5.7 Major performance problems -- 4.6 Architectural recommendations -- 4.6.1 Launching a PAL -- 4.6.2 Hardware memory isolation -- 4.6.3 Hardware context switch -- 4.6.4 Improved TPM support for flicker -- 4.6.5 PAL exit -- 4.6.6 PAL life cycle -- 4.6.7 Expected impact -- 4.6.8 Extensions -- 4.7 Summary --
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 5. Using trustworthy host-based information in the network -- 5.1 Problem definition -- 5.1.1 Architectural goals -- 5.1.2 Assumptions -- 5.2 The assayer architecture -- 5.2.1 Overview -- 5.2.2 Assayer components -- 5.2.3 Protocol details -- 5.2.4 User privacy and client revocation -- 5.3 Potential attacks -- 5.3.1 Exploited clients -- 5.3.2 Malicious clients -- 5.3.3 Rogue verifiers -- 5.3.4 Rogue filters -- 5.4 Case studies -- 5.4.1 Spam identification -- 5.4.2 Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) mitigation -- 5.4.3 Super-spreader worm detection -- 5.5 Implementation -- 5.5.1 Client architecture -- 5.5.2 Client verification -- 5.5.3 Traffic annotation -- 5.5.4 Filter -- 5.6 Evaluation -- 5.6.1 Client verification -- 5.6.2 Client annotations -- 5.6.3 Filter throughput -- 5.6.4 Internet-scale simulation -- 5.7 Potential objections -- 5.7.1 Why not collect information on the local router? -- 5.7.2 Is this really deployable incrementally? -- 5.8 Summary --
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 6. Verifiable computing: secure code execution despite untrusted software and hardware -- 6.1 Overview -- 6.2 Cryptographic background -- 6.2.1 Yao's garbled circuit construction -- 6.2.2 The security of Yao's protocol -- 6.2.3 Fully homomorphic encryption -- 6.3 Problem definition -- 6.3.1 Basic requirements -- 6.3.2 Input and output privacy -- 6.3.3 Efficiency -- 6.4 An efficient verifiable-computation scheme with input and output privacy -- 6.4.1 Protocol definition -- 6.4.2 Proof of security -- 6.4.3 Proof of input and output privacy -- 6.4.4 Efficiency -- 6.5 How to handle cheating workers -- 6.6 Summary --
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 7. Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Author's biography.
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. As society rushes to digitize sensitive information and services, it is imperative that we adopt adequate security protections. However, such protections fundamentally conflict with the benefits we expect from commodity computers. In other words, consumers and businesses value commodity computers because they provide good performance and an abundance of features at relatively low costs. Meanwhile, attempts to build secure systems from the ground up typically abandon such goals, and hence are seldom adopted.
530 ## - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM AVAILABLE NOTE
Additional physical form available note Also available in print.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Computer security.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Computer networks
General subdivision Security measures.
776 08 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Relationship information Print version:
International Standard Book Number 9781627054775
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title ACM books ;
Volume/sequential designation #2.
856 48 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Materials specified Abstract with links to full text
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2611399">http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2611399</a>

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