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Logic, language, and the liar paradox / (Record no. 15085)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03438cam a22004455i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field BRILL9783957438492
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field nllekb
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20260610104835.0
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field cr un uuuua
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 190109s2018 gw 000 0 eng
010 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER
LC control number 2018448602
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9783957438492
Qualifying information (electronic book)
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
Canceled/invalid ISBN 9783957430342
Qualifying information (print)
024 7# - OTHER STANDARD IDENTIFIER
Standard number or code 10.30965/9783957438492
Source of number or code DOI
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (GyWOH)har170495440
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency NL-LeKB
Transcribing agency NL-LeKB
Description conventions rda
050 14 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number BC199.P2
072 #7 - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code HPL
Source bicssc
072 #7 - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code PHI
Subject category code subdivision 011000
Source bisacsh
082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 177.3
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Pleitz, Martin.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Logic, language, and the liar paradox /
Statement of responsibility, etc. Martin Pleitz.
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Münster :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Mentis,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice [2018]
300 ## - online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term text
Content type code txt
Source rdacontent
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
Source rdamedia
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Carrier type term online resource
Source rdacarrier
490 0# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement Schöningh, Fink and mentis Religious Studies, Theology and Philosophy E-Books Online, Collection 2018, ISBN: 9783657100101
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Includes bibliographical references (pages <631>-651)
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note Preliminary Material -- The Liar and Its Kind -- Informal Logic and the Liar Reasoning -- Formal Logic and Tarski’s Legacy -- Meaning, Semantics, and Reductionism -- Singular Terms and the Spectrum of Liar Sentences -- Is There a Gödelian Liar Sentence? -- How Can the Liar Paradox be Solved? -- The Changing World of Expressions -- Language in a Changing World -- Changeable Truth in Language and World -- A Self-Referential Language as Its Own Changing World I: Subsequentist Metaphysics -- A Self-Referential Language as Its Own Changing World II: Subsequentist Semantics -- Subsequentism Solves the Liar Paradox -- Literature.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist – and examples like »This sentence is not true« certainly suggest this –, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? The present study explores the second path. After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Semantics (Philosophy)
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Truth.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Truthfulness and falsehood.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Liar paradox.
776 08 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Relationship information Print version:
Title Logic, Language, and the Liar Paradox
Place, publisher, and date of publication Paderborn : mentis, [2018],
International Standard Book Number 9783957430342
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title Schöningh, Fink and mentis Religious Studies, Theology and Philosophy E-Books Online, Collection 2018, ISBN: 9783657100101.
856 4# - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Public note DOI:
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/9783957438492">http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/9783957438492</a>

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